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Chandler: The Patent System's Relationship to Digital Entrepreneurship

THE PATENT SYSTEM'S RELATIONSHIP TO
DIGITAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Mark Chandler*

Editor's Note: The following is a transcript adaptation of Mr. Mark Chandler's
remarks on Friday, March 27, 2009 at the West Virginia University College of
Law's Law Review Symposium: Digital Entrepreneurship:The Incentives and
Legal Risks.

I hope I can offer some useful thoughts on our patent system and its relationship to digital entrepreneurship.
To organize our discussion, I would like to ask three questions, and offer my own proposed answers to those questions. The three questions are:
First, why do we have a patent system, and what is it supposed to accomplish?
Second, are those purposes being accomplished by the patent system we have today, as it relates to the world of digital
systems and new media?
And third, what should we change to improve our patent
system's effectiveness in the digital world?
I have strong views, and you may agree, or disagree, with my analysis
and conclusions. I hope the discussion I offer at least helps you form your own
opinions.
To the first question, why do we have a patent system, and what is it
supposed to accomplish? You might question my credentials to speak. After all,
I am not a patent lawyer, or even an intellectual property lawyer. I once joked
to a law professor that intellectual property law is too important to be left to
intellectual property lawyers. She promptly printed that statement on posters
promoting a speech I was to give. I was mortified to see the posters, first because it seemed kind of arrogant and more importantly because the audience
included several members of the Federal Circuit, before whom we have cases. I
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explained to the judges that my joking remark had simply been meant to show
the lengths some people will go to speak on topics they know nothing about.
But at a larger level, a generalist might have something to offer, because
the goals of our patent system must be distinguished from the intellectual property rights regime that has developed around it. By that, I mean the following:
at its root, our patent system is a form of industrial policy. The Founders
viewed the patent system as driven by a specific goal. In our Constitution, they
gave Congress the power, and I quote, "To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' Our Founders did not
view patent rights as natural law rights, in the Lockean sense. They are not inalienable, in the same manner as are life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, 2 or, as
Locke had it, life, liberty and property.3 The Founders could have said their
goal was to "protect in perpetuity property rights that are the inalienable expression of one's creativity." But the Founders did not do that.
They created a patent system because they had a policy goal - to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. They wanted to spur economic
development in the nation they were creating, whose greatness they imagined but they demanded there be a time limit on the advantages they were bestowing.
The implication is clear - the promotion of progress in science and useful arts
is the goal, not the protection of some abstract or basic rights.
And that leads to my second question: Are those purposes being met by
the patent system we have today, as it relates to the world of digital systems and
new media?
I believe our system of intellectual property rights is failing as it relates
to digital products. It is failing because in building legal rules around the patent
system, the intellectual property rights regime that supports the patent system,
we have lost sight of the original goal of the Founders.
We all know the importance to economic development of a wellfunctioning, consistent, predictable contract law system. When we work with
other nations about the legal changes necessary for economic development, we
often point to the need for parties to know where they stand going into a deal,
the importance of the enforceability of contracts. Our commercial law system is
held up for admiration around the world.
On the other hand, we do not often hear people say, "To promote economic development, you need to have a tort system just like we do in the United
States." The tort system is designed to redress wrongs and to do that in a highly
individualized way, not to promote economic development. And yet the enforcement mechanisms in our patent system have come to more and more re1

U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.
8.

2

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

3

JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Oskar Piest & Thomas P. Peardon eds.,

The Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690).
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semble our tort system, and principles developed for real property are used as
well. Instead of a patent jurisprudence that is uniquely designed to address the
"promotion of progress in science and the useful arts," 4 we have a system of
rules built by analogy to common law property and tort principles. These analogies utterly fail to support the digital entrepreneur who is seeking to innovate.
And I would like to describe three areas where the failure is most pronounced.
First, there are unnecessary restrictions which preclude a robust review
of whether patents have been properly granted in the first place. Interest groups
representing some patentholders argue they should be entitled to "quiet title" in
their property rights, using the analogy of real property. I also once heard a
patentholder argue that a patent is like a government bond: that once the bond
has been bought, the promise of repayment should be absolute. Well, I say, if it
turns out that the bond was paid for with counterfeit bills, knowingly or unknowingly, the government should not have to redeem the bond. And if it turns out
that the patent should not have been granted, then the patentholder should not
have the ability to enforce it.
Real property can be measured by metes and bounds, and title registries
provide certainty as to real property ownership. A wire transfer to buy a government bond provides assurance of actual payment.
But patents are based on necessarily imperfect disclosure by inventors
and their lawyers, review by an understaffed, underpaid and overworked patent
office, dealing with matters of extraordinary complexity, and with strict
time limitations. For instance, in a typical electronics application, a patent examiner is on average allotted about twenty hours, from the time she opens the
file to the time years later when the patent is issued, to review the file, understand the invention, research and understand all the prior art, go back and forth
with the inventor multiple times, and determine what claims should be rejected
or amended.5
Patentholders have worked hard to build walls that make it difficult for
bona fide validity challenges to proceed. Courts offer a presumption of validity
for patents being litigated - probably not a bad idea given the expertise we
expect the Patent Office to have.6 But the law also ties the Patent Office's hands
to extremely narrow grounds for reexamination. As an example, the law prohibits review of whether another product using the supposed invention was al4

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. cl. 8.
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http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune archive/2006/08/21/8383639/ ("The issue is that
patent applications have tripled in the past two decades, leaving examiners only 20 hours on average to comb through a complex application, research past inventions, and decide whether a patent
should be granted.").
6
See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2002) ("A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent
(whether in independent, dependent. or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim.").
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ready on the market before the patentholder allegedly came up with the invention. Those who want a chance to present evidence in a Patent Office reexamination are blocked not just from raising in court those matters they raise in the
reexamination, but are barred from raising in court any items they could have
raised to the Patent Office, whatever that means. And courts generally do not
stay patent litigation while Patent Office reexaminations occur. That is why we
see miscarriages of justice like Research in Motion's (RIM) payment of $612.5
million to settle the Blackberry litigation, even though the patent office had
started the process of invalidating the patent.
Now, beyond that fact that bad patents are hard to invalidate, the patent
holding companies which have sprung up, which are basically litigation syndicates, have tried to cast infringement as a moral offense. But remember: no
intent is required to infringe a patent.' Not even negligence is required. An
entrepreneur can innocently bring a new product to market, and only later does a
patent issue to someone else, who claims to have invented first. There is no
protection in that innocence. The word infringement, however, perhaps because
it is also used in copyright, where literal copying is required, has been cast with
an element of moral opprobrium. The patent litigation syndicates, and some big
companies, equate infringement with stealing, ignoring that we have special
penalties for willfulness and the typical case involves no willfulness. 9 In virtually all of our cases at Cisco, the plaintiff seeks to leverage settlement by
claiming triple damages for willful infringement, even though in nearly every
instance the first time we have seen or heard of the patents is after our products
have been developed and in the marketplace for years, and no reasonable search
would have flagged the patent as even applicable to our products. And this tortlike concept of "fault," for what is - absent willfulness - a strict liability,
permeates the public debate, distracting from the goal of economic development
which undergirds our patent system. There is an irony here, when we hear "infringement" used as an epithet, that should not be lost: perfectly innocent inventors and entrepreneurs, who can show they had no knowledge of another's work
or had been working on an idea before someone else's patent application was
ever published, can be blocked by the government from bringing their ideas and
See Arik Hesseldahl & Heather Green, Blackberry Won't Get Squashed, Bus. WK., Mar. 3,
2006, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/mar2006/tc20060303_O98230.htm?
campaign id=tbw.
8
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003) (No intent element appears in the statute. Instead, patent
7

infringement occurs when an entity "without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any

patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent .... ").
9

See, e.g., Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211,

1221 (Fed. Cir. 1995)

("Willfulness of infringement is a question of fact, for it includes elements of intent, reasonableness, and belief. The boundary between unintentional and culpable acts is not always bright, for
the facts often include subjective as well as objective elements. Thus willful infringement must be
established by clear and convincing evidence, for it is a punitive finding, and can have the consequence of multiplication of damages.") (citations omitted).
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inventions to market and realizing their dreams. And there is certainly an "infringement" of that innocent prior user's right to "pursue happiness," though
one that we justify on the basis of the constitutional goal of progress. And yet,
tort-like "fault" concepts prevail, even in ordinary, non-willful patent cases.
And finally, like the tort system, our zeal to award damages creates uncertainty as to outcomes. The fifteen-factor Georgia Pacific test is a nightmare
for litigants who want to predict the outcome of a case.' ° In the absence of certainty, litigation gamesmanship and leverage become the dominant modes of
interaction. If we had a vague, fifteen-factor jury-decided test for breach of
contract cases, our commercial system would grind to a halt. The absence of a
clear rule as to when damages should be based on the entire market value of a
product that simply includes a feature that may infringe a patent, as opposed to
the economic value added by the feature itself, is a disaster for those in the digital world, who build complex products.
That is why we have seen patent litigation rise from about 900 cases in
1990 with 1500 defendants, to almost 3000 cases and more than 9000 defendants in 2007.'' And that is why, similar to the tort system, we see allegations
of forum shopping in the debate over patents. The rise of the patent holding
companies, who build no products themselves, acting as litigation syndicates,
reflects the ability under the current rules to leverage uncertainty, and reflects
the move away from the goal of "promotion of progress in science and the useful arts." In Cisco's case, we have gone from three cases a decade ago, all involving competitors, to over thirty today, with almost all the cases brought by
litigation syndicates which have no interest whatsoever in bringing products to
market. As Justice Kennedy wrote about the rise of the patent litigation syndicates in the Ebay case, "An industry has developed in which firms use patents
not as a basis for producing
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtain12
ing licensing fees."'
Carl Shapiro at Berkeley, the newly appointed Chief Economist of the
Antitrust Division in the Justice Department, in his path-breaking writing about
patent thickets, said it best in describing the effect all of this has on the digital

10

See Georgia Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y.

1970).

1

Marie-Anne Hogarth, Proposed U.S. Senate Bill Would Limit Patent Lawsuit Damages, E.

BAY Bus. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2008/03/03/
focusl.html ("There were 900 patent suits involving 1,500 defendants nationally in 1990 .... );
Stanford University IP Litigation Clearinghouse. Patent Infringement Filings and Number of
Patent
Infringement
Defendants
2006 2009
(2009),

http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/iplc/ (subscription required) (There were 2840
patent infringement filings in 2007 with 9077 defendants.) see also Mark Chandler, Senior Vice
President and General Counsel, Cisco Systems, Address at the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong.: Perspectives on Patents: Post-Grant Review Procedures and Other Litigation Reforms (2006).
12

Ebay Inc. v. Mercexchange. LLC, 547 U.S. 388. 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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entrepreneur. I will quote from him, since my attempt to paraphrase cannot do
justice to his eloquence. He wrote:
Our current patent system is causing a potentially dangerous
situation in several fields, including biotechnology, semiconductors, computer software, and e-commerce, in which a
would-be entrepreneur or innovator may face a barrage of infringement actions that it must overcome to bring its product or
service to market. In other words, we are in danger of creating
significant transaction costs for those seeking to commercialize
new technology based on multiple patents, overlapping rights,
and holdup problems. Under these circumstances, it is fair to
ask whether the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of
strong patent rights, ranging from the standards used at the Patent and Trademark Office for approving patent applications, to
the secrecy of such applications, to the presumption afforded by
the courts to patent validity, to the right of patent holders to
seek injunctive relief by insisting that
infringing firms cease
13
production of the offending products.
Professor Shapiro's grim description now leads directly to the third of
my three questions: what should we change to improve our patent system's
effectiveness in the digital world?
I will start with some bad news. Change is hard. It is hard because
those who benefit from an existing system, no matter how imbalanced or counterproductive, will fight aggressively to protect their benefits. Right now the
system works well for those who have products covered by a single or small
number of patents, such as pharmaceutical and chemical companies. And it
works well for those with weak patents, or for the litigation syndicates whose
business model is based on extracting maximum dollars through threats and
leverage.
The good news is that the courts, when presented with the right cases,
have begun to recognize how dysfunctional our patent system is. The Supreme
Court's unanimous decision in Ebay brought some common sense to use of injunctions in patent cases. In KSR Internationalv. Telefax Inc.,14 again by a unanimous vote, the Supreme Court made common sense improvements to the
13

See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Stan-

dard-Setting 28, Competition Policy Center, University of California, Berkeley (May 2000),
http: //repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 1015&context iber/cpc.

14 550 U.S. 398 (2007). The Court held that "[i]n
determining whether the subject matter of a
patent claim is obvious, neither the particular motivation nor the avowed purpose of the patentee
controls. What matters is the objective reach of the claim. If the claim extends to what is obvious, it is invalid under § 103. One of the ways in which a patent's subject matter can be proved
obvious is by noting that there existed at the time of invention a known problem for which there
was an obvious solution encompassed by the patent's claims." ld. at 419 20.
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definition of what is obvious, cutting off patentability in some cases where there
is no promotion of progress in science and the useful arts. The 7-1 decision in
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 5 limited a bizarre extraterritorial application of
U.S. patents that had been used by plaintiffs to ratchet up the damage claims and
thereby extract settlements. And the unanimous Supreme Court decision in
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. 16 limited the scope of follow-on
suits when a patent is already licensed, avoiding double dipping by patentholders. When Justices across the spectrum agree on four cases, you can bet the law
was way out of whack. By the same token, the Federal Circuit's decisions regarding willfulness in In re Seagate Technology, 17 and regarding abstract patents
in In re Bilski,18 also helped to take unnecessary leverage out of the patent system and eliminate a class of patents that represented no real inventive activity.
I will sketch out three areas where more change is urgently needed to
ensure we have a patent system that protects true ingenuity.
First, damages rules must be clarified so that entrepreneurs do not have
to worry about the risk of absurd jury verdicts based on the entire market value
of a complex product. I do not blame jurors for being confused when told to
take into account the fifteen Georgia Pacific factors. It only takes a few bad
cases to make dozens of patent holding companies think it is worth their while
to sue an entire industry. Dozens of different U.S. patent holders claim that the
WiFi 802.11 standard cannot be practiced without infringing their patents. A
number have brought suit, all, of course, seeking a royalty based on the entire
market value of the WiFi device. These high damage claim cases, based on
uncertainly regarding the entire market value rule, are a key source of unmerited
leverage for plaintiffs.
Second, a fair system needs to be put in place so that those who have
been sued, who have bona fide evidence of invalidity, can go back to the Patent
Office with that evidence. It is essential that errors by the Patent Office in the
initial review process not be rewarded with patents that are nearly invulnerable
to attack. The review process must of course be speedy so that patentholders do
not get bogged down with repetitive challenges and denied their day in court.
But the system should also encourage patentholders to assert their claims early,
rather than waiting for an entire industry to develop before suing. By the way, it
is this business strategy of waiting until an industry has developed that caused
Peter Detkin, then of Intel and now Intellectual Ventures, to refer to the patent
litigation syndicates as "trolls."1 9
15

550 U.S. 437 (2007).

16

128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).

17

497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that willful patent infringement requires some

proof of recklessness).
18
545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
19
See Peter N. Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.

L. 636, 636 (2007).
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Third, and finally, the standards-setting process should be looked at
anew. Standards bodies are simply too vulnerable to being misused by those
who would enshrine their private intellectual property advantage in what becomes a mandatory industry standard. The sanctions for violating the commitment to reasonable and non-discriminatory terms are neither strict enough nor
uniformly enough applied to make a real difference.
With these steps, we can rebuild a patent system that focuses on innovation, not litigation, and fulfills the constitutional mandate to promote progress.
Let us go back to our questions and review the answers I have offered:
First, why do we have a patent system, and what is it supposed to accomplish? I say the purpose is to drive innovation
and promote economic growth, not to reward gamesmanship
and litigation skill.
Second, are those purposes being accomplished by the patent system we have today, as it relates to the world of digital
systems and new media? My answer is no - that we need a
patent jurisprudence focused on the goals of promoting progress
in science and useful arts, in driving economic growth and innovation, rather than one built on analogies to torts and real estate.
And third, what should we change to improve our patent
system's effectiveness in the digital world? Well, I have
spelled out what I think needs to be done. A bipartisan group of
Senators and Congressmen have introduced patent reform legislation to eliminate these abuses and strengthen our patent system. This year, with your help, we can get the job done. I urge
you to join with me in writing to your Senators, asking them to
support Senator Leahy and Senator Hatch's patent reform legislation, and restore the greatness of our patent system.
Thank you again for the chance to join the Symposium, and for your attention today.
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